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Renewable	   energy	   transitions	   are	   considered	   expensive	   due	   to	   their	   high	   initial	   capital	   costs	   and	  
hence	   require	   regulatory	   support,	   for	   example	   through	   preferential	   pricing	   mechanisms	   (Owen,	  
2006;	   Nelson	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   However,	   subsequently	   increasing	   electricity	   prices,	   paired	   with	   a	  
displacement	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  industries,	  have	  potentially	  negative	  effects	  on	  economic	  growth	  (Frondel	  
et	  al.,	  2010;	  Marques	  and	  Fuinhas,	  2012).	  As	  such,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  European	  economic	  and	  debt	  
crisis,	  Slominski	  (2016)	  suggests	  that	  economic	  issues	  have	  been	  prioritised	  over	  climate	  change,	  as	  
concerns	  over	  the	  cost	  implications	  of	  climate	  measures	  heightened.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  2013	  Bulgaria	  
became	  the	  first	  EU	  member-­‐state	  to	  reach	  and	  exceed	  its	  renewable	  targets	  under	  the	  Europe	  2020	  
Strategy	  after	  having	  essentially	  no	   renewable	  energy	   installed	  prior	   to	   its	  accession	   in	  2007	   (with	  
the	  exception	  of	  large-­‐scale	  hydropower).	  This	  article	  therefore	  seeks	  to	  determine	  how	  Bulgaria,	  as	  
the	  poorest	  EU	  member-­‐state,	  managed	   to	  meet	   its	  2020	   renewable	   targets	   in	   times	  of	  economic	  
crisis	  and	  austerity,	  and	  the	  consequences	  for	  its	  economy	  and	  energy	  system.	  
Generally,	   contemporary	   literature	   has	   identified	   several	   influential	   factors	   shaping	  
renewable	  energy	  transitions,	  such	  as	  the	  need	  for	  a	  strong	  long-­‐term	  political	  support	  (Fabra	  et	  al.,	  
2015),	  an	  effective	  and	  dynamic	  policy	  design	  (Nicholls	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Haas,	  Panzer,	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Haas,	  
Resch,	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  as	  well	  as	  a	   supportive	  macroeconomic	  wealth	  context,	   such	  as	  high	   levels	  of	  
income	   (Eyraud	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   expanding	   renewables	   is	   associated	   with	   wider	  
environmental,	  economic	  and	  societal	  benefits.	  These	  include	  lower	  energy	  costs	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  
long-­‐run	   (Fabra	   et	   al.,	   2015),	   as	   well	   as	   an	   improved	   availability	   and	   sustainability	   of	   the	   energy	  
system	   in	   terms	   of	   reduced	   emissions,	   distributed	   power	   generators,	   and	   an	   infinite	   resource	  
availability	   (International	   Energy	   Agency,	   2009;	   World	   Nuclear	   Association,	   2011;	   Omer,	   2008;	  
Chodkowska-­‐Miszczuk,	  2014).	  However,	   the	  majority	  of	   literature	  on	   renewable	  energy	   transitions	  
has	   focussed	   on	   wealthy	   countries,	   such	   as	   Denmark,	   Germany,	   and	   the	   UK	   (Foxon	   et	   al.,	   2008;	  
Cherrington	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Toke,	   2011;	   Lund,	   2007;	   Jacobsson	   and	   Lauber,	   2006;	   Lehr	   et	   al.,	   2012;	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Stefes,	  2010).	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  address	  how	  well	  these	  assumptions	  and	  potential	  benefits	  
stand	  up	  in	  a	  less-­‐wealthy	  country.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  benefits	  of	  renewable	  energy	  transitions	  resonate	  with	  several	  aspects	  of	  
energy	   justice.	   These	   aim	   to	   ensure	   access	   to	   clean	   and	   affordable	   energy,	   and	   to	   overcome	   the	  
unequal	  distribution	  of	  environmental	  ills	  associated	  with	  the	  production	  and	  use	  of	  energy	  through	  
an	  inclusive	  and	  transparent	  process	  in	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  energy	  projects	  and	  
policies	  (Jenkins	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  Based	  on	  Jenkins	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  energy	  justice	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  
analytical	   framework	  for	  researching	  energy	  systems,	  and	  can	  be	  applied	  as	  a	  “conceptual	   tool	   for	  
ethicists,	   an	   analytical	   tool	   for	   energy	   researchers,	   and	   a	   decision-­‐making	   tool	   for	   policy-­‐makers”	  
(Sovacool	   and	   Dworkin,	   2015;	   Islar	   et	   al.,	   2017,	   p.671).	   While	   selected	   works	   have	   addressed	  
burdens	  and	  benefits	  of	  renewable	  energy	  transitions	  (Sovacool	  and	  Dworkin,	  2014;	  Sovacool,	  2017),	  
to	   the	  best	  of	  our	   knowledge,	   there	  has	   so	   far	  not	  been	  an	   inclusive	  analysis	  of	   them	   in	   terms	  of	  
energy	  justice.	  This	  gap	  on	  comprehensively	  establishing	  potential	  synergies	  between	  the	  objectives	  
of	  energy	  justice	  and	  the	  impacts	  of	  renewable	  energy	  transitions	  is	  evident	  in	  both	  the	  renewable	  
energy	   and	   energy	   justice	   literatures,	   although	   renewables	   do	   take	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   energy	  
justice	  debates	  (Fuller	  and	  McCauley,	  2016;	  Jenkins	  et	  al.,	  2017,	  2016;	  Sovacool	  and	  Dworkin,	  2015).	  
This	  paper	  therefore	  hopes	  to	  help	  close	  this	  gap	  by	  addressing	  the	  societal	  and	  economic	  impacts	  of	  
Bulgaria’s	   renewable	  energy	   transition	   in	   terms	  of	   energy	   justice,	   and	   thereby	  provide	  a	  potential	  
pathway	  for	  future	  analyses.	  It	  further	  contributes	  to	  our	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  drivers	  
and	  factors	  shaping	  renewable	  energy	  transitions	  in	  a	  less-­‐wealthy	  country	  by	  analysing	  the	  largely	  
under-­‐researched	  case	  of	  Bulgaria.	  	  
The	   paper	   begins	   with	   an	   outline	   of	   our	   conceptual	   and	   methodological	   approach.	   The	  
analysis	   first	   addresses	  how	  Bulgaria	   achieved	   its	  2020	   targets.	   In	   this	   section,	  we	   conduct	  a	  brief	  
policy	  analysis	  of	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  that	  drove	  the	  transition,	  and	  draw	  from	  a	  set	  of	  semi-­‐
structured	   interviews	   to	   identify	   the	   key	   influential	   factors	   that	   established	   the	   favourable	   policy	  
environment.	  We	  then	  analyse	  the	  consequences	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  fast	  expansion	  of	  renewables.	  In	  the	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last	  part	  of	   the	  analysis,	  we	  assess	   the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria’s	   renewable	  energy	   transition	   through	   the	  
lens	  of	  energy	  justice.	  To	  do	  so	  we	  expand	  on	  the	  existing	  energy	  justice	  framework.	  We	  then	  discuss	  
our	  findings	  and	  offer	  some	  conclusions.	  
	  	  	  
2. Conceptual	  and	  Methodological	  Approach	  
Our	   analysis	   employs	   a	   mixed-­‐method	   approach,	   including	   a	   set	   of	   semi-­‐structured	   expert	  
interviews,	  as	  well	  as	  analyses	  of	  major	  policies	  and	  reports,	  and	  is	  supported	  by	  secondary	  sources,	  
such	  as	  peer-­‐reviewed	  articles.	  Between	  February	  and	  April	  2017,	  we	  conducted	  eight	  interviews	  in	  
Bulgaria	  via	  Skype	  with	  members	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations,	  academia,	  and	  the	  media,	  as	  
well	  as	  politicians	  and	  civil	  servants	  to	  establish	  the	  factors	  influencing	  Bulgaria’s	  renewable	  energy	  
transition	  and	  to	  gain	  insights	  into	  its	  consequences.	  Interview	  contributions	  are	  coded	  according	  to	  
their	   affiliation.
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   The	   paper	   is	   guided	   by	   these	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   and	   supported	   by	   the	  
qualitative	  analysis.	  	  
	   Adding	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  initial	  investigation	  we	  assess	  Bulgaria’s	  renewables	  expansion	  
in	  light	  of	  energy	  justice.	  Rooted	  in	  environmental	  justice,	  this	  approach	  questions	  the	  justice,	  equity	  
and	   fairness	   of	   contemporary	   energy	   systems.	   As	   a	   framework	   it	   follows	   the	   three	   tenets	   of	  
distributional	  justice	  (benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  energy	  systems),	  procedural	  justice	  (fair,	  transparent,	  
non-­‐discriminatory	   and	   inclusive	   decision-­‐making	   processes),	   and	   justice	   as	   recognition	   (uphold	  
human	  dignity)	  (McCauley	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Islar	  et	  al.,	  2017;	  Jenkins	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  Energy	  justice	  thereby	  
incorporates	  issues	  of	  economics,	  scarcity	  and	  pollution	  by	  focusing	  on	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  
energy,	  and	  its	  production,	  generation,	  and	  consumption,	  as	  well	  as	  consequent	  societal	  implications	  
though	  a	  lens	  of	  intra-­‐	  and	  intergenerational	  justice	  (Sovacool	  and	  Dworkin,	  2015;	  Islar	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  	  
Based	   on	   the	   three	   justice	   tenet	   framework,	   Sovacool	   and	  Dworkin	   (2015)	   establish	   eight	  
principles	  of	  energy	  justice:	  availability	  (access	  to	  energy),	  affordability	  (cost	  of	  energy),	  due	  process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
	  Academia	  (ACAD),	  Bulgarian	  Energy	  and	  Mining	  Forum	  (BEMF),	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy	  (CSD),	  
Government	  (GOV),	  Green	  Party	  (GREEN),	  Media	  Outlet	  (NEW),	  and	  the	  WWF	  (WWF).	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(stakeholder	   participation,	   rule	   of	   law),	   good	   governance	   (fair	   and	   transparent	   decision-­‐making	  
processes;	   effective,	   efficient	   and	   responsive	   legislation),	   sustainability	   (sustainable	   use	   of	  
resources),	  intragenerational	  equity	  (equal	  access	  to	  basic	  energy	  services),	  intergenerational	  equity	  
(right	  of	  future	  generations	  to	  live	  undisturbed	  of	  the	  damage	  inflicted	  by	  today’s	  energy	  systems),	  
and	   responsibility	   (all	   nations	   are	   responsible	   to	  minimise	   energy-­‐related	   environmental	   threats).	  
While	  these	  principles	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  specialised	  analysis	  of	  energy	  justice	  factors,	  they	  are	  highly	  
interrelated	  and	  mutually	  reinforcing.	  We	  therefore	  analyse	  them	  in	  a	  grouped	  format	  with	  respect	  
to	  (i)	  due	  process	  and	  good	  governance,	  (ii)	  availability,	  sustainability	  and	  affordability,	  (iii)	  and	  intra-­‐	  
and	   intergenerational	   justice,	   and	   responsibility.	   Furthermore,	   justice	   is	   an	   inherently	   contested	  
concept	   and	   therefore,	   rather	   than	   considering	   justice	   as	   an	   absolute,	  we	   seek	   to	   identify	   justice	  
trends	   in	  Bulgaria’s	  energy	  system.	   In	   the	   following	  we	  outline	   the	  groups	  of	  analysis	  and	  how	  we	  
measure	  achieving,	  or	  failing	  to	  achieve,	  greater	  energy	  justice	  in	  each	  principle.	  
We	   firstly	   analyse	   the	   principles	   of	   ‘due	   process’	   and	   ‘good	   governance’,	   addressing	  
primarily	  the	  procedural	  justice	  and	  justice	  as	  recognition	  tenets.	  We	  identify	  ‘due	  process’	  through	  
(i)	   the	   inclusion	   of	   relevant	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   and	   effective	  
consultations	  with	  affected	  communities,	  and	  (ii)	   the	  provision	  of	  environmental	  and	  social	   impact	  
assessments.	   ‘Good	   governance’	   is	   identified	   according	   to	   a	   low	   level	   of	   corruption,	   transparent	  
government	   actions,	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   effective,	   efficient	   and	   responsive	   legislation.	   We	  
therefore	   assess	   (i)	   if	   the	   Bulgarian	   government	   made	   information	   on	   policies	   and	   agreements	  
publicly	  available,	  and	  (ii)	  if	  implemented	  policies	  achieved	  their	  intentions,	  and	  were	  responsive	  to	  
unforeseen	  contextual	  changes.	  	  
Secondly,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   distributive	   justice	   tenet	   by	   determining	   the	   availability,	  
affordability	  and	  sustainability	  principles.	  As	  ‘availability’	  is	  improved	  if	  a	  country	  can	  guarantee	  the	  
undisrupted	  provision	  of	  high-­‐quality	  energy	  services	  to	  its	  population,	  we	  determine	  improvements	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in	  terms	  of	  overall	  energy	  dependence	  levels,
2
	  stability	  of	  the	  grid	  (represented	  through	  distribution	  
losses),	   and	   quality	   of	   energy	   supply.	   ‘Affordability’	   is	   concerned	   with	   energy	   costs	   borne	   by	  
consumers	  and	  improved	  –	  and	  thereby	  measured	  –	  according	  to	  price	  stability	  (minimal	  volatility)	  
and	  actual	   costs	   that	  are	  not	   to	  exceed	  10%	  of	   income,	  which	   is	   the	  commonly	  used	   threshold	  of	  
energy	  poverty	  (Islar	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  We	  measure	  improved	  ‘sustainability’	  from	  a	  climate	  and	  energy	  
perspective.	  We	  therefore	  assess	  whether	  emission	  levels	  have	  been	  reduced	  and	  renewable	  energy	  
sources	   increased.	  Renewables	  are	   the	  most	   sustainable	  energy	   sources	   since	   they	  do	  not	   require	  
the	  exploitation	  of	  finite	  resource	  stocks.	  
Finally,	  we	  address	  intra	  and	  inter-­‐generational	  equity	  and	  responsibility.	  As	  each	  principle	  is	  
dependent	  on	  the	  achievements	  in	  already	  analysed	  justice	  principles,	  this	  group	  acts	  somewhat	  as	  
an	  overall	  summary	  of	  energy	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  contemporary	  justice,	  future	  justice,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  
government.	   ‘Intragenerational	   equity’	   represents	   a	   combination	   of	   above	   factors	   of	   access	   to	  
energy	   to	   all	   (availability)	   without	   discrimination	   (due	   process/good	   governance),	   at	   a	   price	   that	  
neither	   overburdens	   poorer	   sections	   of	   society	   (affordability),	   nor	   results	   in	   the	   pollution	   of	  
environmental	   goods,	   such	   as	   air	   (sustainability).	   ‘Intergenerational	   equity’,	   in	   turn,	   is	   concerned	  
with	  the	  effects	  of	  contemporary	  actions	  for	  future	  generations,	  and	  thereby	  depends	  on	  the	  current	  
meeting	   of	   energy	   justice	   principles	   that	   affect	   the	   future,	   particularly	   the	   sustainability	   principle.	  
Also	   relating	   particularly	   to	   current	   sustainability	   actions	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   ‘responsibility’	   that	  
considers	   nations	   to	   be	   responsible	   to	   protect	   the	   natural	   environment,	   limit	   social	   and	  
environmental	   costs	   associated	  with	   the	   production	   and	  use	   of	   energy.	   It	   therefore	   considers	   the	  
ability	  and	  willingness	  of	  the	  government	  to	  improve	  the	  sustainability	  of	  its	  energy	  system.	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  In	  terms	  of	  energy	  security,	  and	  as	  stressed	  by	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  (2014a)	  European	  Energy	  Security	  
Strategy,	  dependence	  of	  imports	  for	  energy	  is	  considered	  a	  risk.	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3. Background:	   Enabling	   Bulgaria’s	   Renewable	   Energy	   Transitions	   in	   Times	   of	  
Crisis	  
The	   global	   financial	   and	   economic	   crisis	   paired	   with	   the	   European	   Debt	   Crisis	   had	   extensive	  
implications	   for	   the	   Bulgarian	   economy	   that	   suffered	   from	   a	   decreasing	   purchasing	   power	   of	   the	  
population	  in	  light	  of	  rising	  unemployment	  levels,	  which	  led	  to	  falling	  government	  revenues	  (Petkov,	  
2014;	  Milio	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  With	  a	  traditional	  focus	  on	  maintaining	  a	  balanced	  budget,	  Bulgaria	  quickly	  
introduced	   austerity	   measures	   to	   counteract	   a	   growing	   government	   deficit	   primarily	   by	   slashing	  
expenditures,	  for	  example,	  in	  public	  services	  and	  environmental	  protection	  (Petkov,	  2014).	  By	  2012,	  
deficit	  levels	  had	  returned	  to	  a	  healthy	  0.8%	  with	  austerity	  considered	  a	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  reaching	  
the	  convergence	  criteria
3
	  (Eurostat,	  2017).	  	  
	   For	  the	  renewable	  energy	  market,	  the	  economic	  crisis	  initially	  had	  a	  positive	  effect.	  Based	  on	  
Bulgaria’s	   first	   renewables	   law	   of	   2007
4
,	   and	   its	   2008	   amendment
5
,	   the	   country	   had	   established	  
generous	   feed-­‐in	   tariffs	   (FITs)	   for	   renewables	   at	   almost	   140EUR/MWh	   for	   wind	   under	   15	   year	  
contracts,	  and	  between	  718	  and	  782EUR/MWh	  for	  solar	  photovoltaics	  (PV)	  under	  25	  year	  contracts,	  
depending	  on	  size	  (EREC,	  2009).	  As	  the	  economic	  crisis	  led	  to	  reduced	  investment	  opportunities	  and	  
renewable	  support	  in	  some	  European	  markets,	  Bulgaria’s	  highly	  attractive	  renewable	  support	  drew	  a	  
large	  number	  of	  developers,	  resulting	  in	  a	  fast	  growing	  interest	  in	  renewable	  investments	  in	  Bulgaria	  
(Winkel	  et	   al.,	   2011).
6
	   In	   2008,	   the	  National	   Electric	   Company	   (NEC)	   received	   requests	   for	   almost	  
7.7GW	  of	  wind	  power	  alone	  (Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  2010).	  The	  2009	  Renewable	  Energy	  
Directive	   –	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   2010	   Europe	   2020	   Strategy	   and	   its	   renewable	   targets	   (European	  
Commission,	   2010)	   –	   induced	   further	   beneficial	   policy	   adjustments	   that,	   for	   example,	   guaranteed	  
connection	   to	   the	   grid	   and	   priority	   dispatch	   for	   renewables,	   and	   provided	   for	   shared	   costs	   in	   the	  
construction	   and	   connection	   of	   renewables,	   with	   the	   largest	   share	   being	   taken	   over	   by	   the	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  In	  2016,	  government	  deficit	  in	  %	  of	  GDP	  stood	  at	  0	  (Eurostat	  Press	  Office,	  2014).	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  The	  State	  Gazette,	  No.	  49	  of	  19	  June	  2007	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  The	  State	  Gazette,	  No.	  98	  of	  14	  November	  2008	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  BG-­‐WWF-­‐001;	  BG-­‐NEW-­‐01	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distribution	  company	  (Republic	  of	  Bulgaria,	  2011).	  The	  FiT	  price	  was	  recalculated	  to	  amount	  to	  80%	  
of	   the	   average	   selling	   price	   of	   electricity	   in	   the	   reference	   year,	   plus	   a	   surcharge	   equivalent	   to,	   or	  
higher	   than,	   the	   surcharge	   of	   the	   previous	   year	   (Gramatikova,	   2012;	   RES	   Legal,	   2017;	   Republic	   of	  
Bulgaria,	  2011).	  	  
By	   2011,	   about	   10GW	  worth	   of	   renewable	   projects	   applied	   for	   connection;	   exceeding	   the	  
capacity	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  by	  approximately	  100%	  (Gramatikova,	  2012).	  Additionally,	  falling	  price	  
levels	   for	   PV	   solar	   and	   the	   inability	   of	   preferential	   price	   levels	   to	  be	   adequately	   adjusted	   led	   to	   a	  
surge	   in	   projects	   in	   2012	   that	   saw	   solar	   capacity	   increase	   almost	   seven-­‐fold	   compared	   to	   2011.	  
While	  the	  National	  Renewable	  Energy	  Action	  Plan	  envisaged	  solar	  PV	  capacity	  to	  reach	  300-­‐320MW	  
by	  2020	  (Republic	  of	  Bulgaria,	  2011,	  p.159),	  actual	  solar	  capacity	  grew	  from	  150MW	  in	  2011	  to	  over	  
1GW	   in	   2012	   (Nikolaev	   and	   Konidari,	   2017).	   Unforeseen	   by	   the	   government,	   these	   growth	   levels	  
meant	  that	  by	  late	  2012,	  Bulgaria	  had	  already	  met	  and	  exceeded	  its	  2020	  target	  for	  final	  energy	  of	  
16%,	  reaching	  over	  17%	  in	  2013	  (EurObserv’Er,	  2015).	  
While	  the	  economic	  crisis	  effectively	  re-­‐directed	  freed	  capital	  from	  other	  renewable	  energy	  
markets	   to	  Bulgaria,	   it	  was	   the	  particular	   characteristics	  of	   the	   regulatory	  environment	   in	  Bulgaria	  
that	  enabled	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  renewables.	  In	  this	  sense,	  corruption	  and	  bad	  governance	  have	  
been	  associated	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  renewable	  energy	   in	  Bulgaria	  from	  its	   inception.	  Generally,	  
the	  Global	  Competitiveness	   Index	   identified	   inefficient	  government	  bureaucracy	  and	  corruption	  as	  
the	   country’s	   most	   problematic	   factors	   for	   years	   (World	   Economic	   Forum,	   2007,	   2016).	   As	   such,	  
state	   capture,	   cronyism,	   dysfunctional	   state	   institutions	   and	   corrupt	   judiciaries	   remain	   a	  
fundamental	  concern	  in	  Bulgaria	  (OECD,	  2013).	  Indeed,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  accession,	  rather	  than	  fulfilling	  
the	   requirements	   of	   the	  acquis	   communautaire,	   corruption	  was	   seen	   to	   increase	   (Vachudova	   and	  
Spendzharova,	   2012),	   resulting	   in	   the	   initiation	   of	   the	   Cooperation	   and	   Verification	   Mechanism	  
(CVM)	   by	   the	   European	   Commission	   (European	   Commission,	   2017).
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   In	   2008	   the	   EU	   froze	   a	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  The	  CVM	  	  seeks	  “to	  address	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  judicial	  reform,	  and	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  and	  
organised	  crime”	  (European	  Commission,	  2017,	  p.2).	  
9	  
	  
significant	   amount	   of	   funds
8	  
for	   Bulgaria	   after	   corruption	   in	   the	   disbursement	   of	   regional	  
development	  moneys	  by	  Bulgaria’s	   state	  administration	  came	  to	   light	   (Vachudova,	  2009).	  As	   such,	  
the	  renewable	  policy	  in	  2008	  is	  said	  to	  have	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  sustainable	  energy	  policy	  or	  climate	  
change,	  but	  with	  ways	  to	  find	  new	  finance	  opportunities	  from	  the	  EU.
9
	  Indeed,	  as	  a	  new	  member	  to	  
the	  EU,	  Bulgaria	  saw	  significant	  funding	  opportunities	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  renewable	  energy	  
(Hiteva	  and	  Maltby,	  2017).	  	  
Being	   pushed	   for	   by	   developers	   and	   investors,	   the	   resulting	   lucrative	   opportunities	   were	  
presented	   by	   the	   government	   as	   the	   result	   of	   merely	   following	   their	   obligations	   under	   the	   EU	  
framework.
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   In	   fact,	   the	   promotion	   of	   renewable	   energy	   in	   Bulgaria	   followed	   a	   top-­‐down	  
Europeanisation	   process	   also	   prior	   to	   the	   2020	   Strategy	   (Hiteva	   and	  Maltby,	   2017).	   However,	   the	  
public	  saw	  renewable	  policy	  to	  be	  primarily	  driven	  “by	  private	  interest	  and	  made	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  
generate	  maximum	  profit	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  companies”.
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  For	  example,	  while	  the	  
2011	  Energy	  from	  Renewable	  Sources	  Act	  (ERSA)	  lowered	  Feed-­‐in	  Tarrif	  (FiT)	  rates	  and	  the	  length	  of	  
purchase	  contracts	  for	  renewable	  projects,	  any	  project	  connected	  to	  the	  market	  prior	  to	  2008	  was	  
explicitly	   exempt	   from	   these	   changes	   (Government	   of	   Bulgaria,	   2011a).	   These	   few	   projects	   were	  
implemented	  by	  “offshore	  companies	  that	  are	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  related	  to	  the	  Bulgarian	  Mafia	  
[and	  that]	  are	  still	  getting	  the	  higher	  price	  of	  tariffs	  [read,	  the	  unreduced	  price]”.
12
	  	  
The	   initially	   generous	   renewable	   incentives	   are	   therefore	   commonly	   associated	   with	   a	  
mutually	  beneficial	  relationship	  between	  developers,	  investors	  and	  politicians	  with	  several	  MPs	  also	  
being	   accused	   of	   making	   legislation	   in	   favour	   of	   their	   own	   business	   interests,	   having	   invested	  
themselves	  in	  renewable	  projects.
13
	  As	  such,	  the	  strong	  influence	  of	  certain	  interest	  groups	  directly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8
	  The	  EC	  “cut	  off	  Bulgaria’s	  funding	  for	  road	  construction	  after	  the	  arrest	  for	  bribery	  of	  two	  Bulgarian	  road	  
agency	  officials.	  Some	  €115	  million	  in	  money	  destined	  for	  roads	  were	  frozen,	  followed	  by	  €121	  million	  in	  













led	   to	   the	   rapid	   expansion	   in	   renewable	   capacity,	   as	   “renewable	   energy	   producers	   and	   their	  
investors	  were	  pressing	  for	  good	  conditions”.
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3.1 The	  Implications	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  Renewable	  Expansion	  
Fuelled	  by	  the	  generous	  FiT	  scheme,	  renewable	  capacity	  grew	  at	  a	  rate	  that	  challenged	  both	  the	  grid	  
operator	  and	  electric	  companies.	  The	  transmission	  system	  operator	  (TSO)	  struggled	  severely	   in	  the	  
early	   years	   of	   the	   rapid	   capacity	   growth	   to	   accommodate	   the	   connection	   of	   all	   new	   renewable	  
projects.	   As	   the	   TSO	   was	   legally	   obligated	   to	   provide	   grid	   connection	   and	   priority	   access	   to	  
renewables,	   Bulgaria	  was	   criticised	   by	   the	   EU	   over	   its	   failure	   to	   provide	   appropriate	  mechanisms	  
regulating	  the	  connection	  of	  renewables	  to	  the	  grid	  (Kirov,	  2012).	  Indeed,	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  
did	   not	   provide	   incentives	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   grid,	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   shortage	   of	  
transmission	  capacity.	  Furthermore,	  about	  50%	  of	  wind	  power	  is	  located	  in	  the	  north-­‐east	  region	  of	  
the	   country,	   far	   from	  major	  population/consumption	   centres	  of	   Sofia	   and	  Plovdiv	   in	   the	  west	  and	  
south-­‐west	  (Jirous	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  In	  order	  not	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  fines	  by	  infringing	  on	  its	  connection	  
obligation,	  officially,	  the	  TSO	  argued	  that	  the	  effective	  curtailing	  of	  wind	  energy	  plants	  in	  this	  region	  
to	  50%	  of	  capacity	  was	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  grid	  system	  as	  only	  few	  renewable	  sources	  could	  serve	  
as	  balancing	  capacities	  (Jirous	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
In	   light	   of	   the	   vast	   amount	   of	   renewables	   projects	   that	   sought	   development,	   distribution	  
companies	   began	   rejecting	   connection	   applications	   in	   2010,	   and	   awaited	   the	   announced	   policy	  
amendments	  by	  the	  Bulgarian	  government	  for	  2011	  (Winkel	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Gramatikova,	  2012).	  From	  
May	  2011,	  Bulgaria’s	  Energy	  From	  Renewable	  Energy	  Sources	  Act	  (ERSA)	  abolished	  priority	  access	  for	  
renewables	   to	   ease	   the	   pressure	   on	   the	   grid	   and	   introduced	   obligatory	   advance	   payments	   of	  
renewable	  developers	  to	  counteract	  speculative	  projects	  (Government	  of	  Bulgaria,	  2011a).	  The	  Act	  
further	   adjusted	   the	   renewable	   growth	   trajectory	   to	   1%	   per	   year,	   which	   in	   effect	   would	   render	  
Bulgaria	  unable	  to	  reach	  the	  	  2020	  targets	  of	  16%,	  and	  reduced	  the	  duration	  of	  purchase	  contracts	  





retroactively,	  while	  restricting	  medium	  and	  large	  scale	  investment	  projects	  (Government	  of	  Bulgaria,	  
2011a).	   The	   Act	   reorganised	   the	   administrative	   unit	   promoting	   renewable	   energy	   production	   by	  
converting	   the	   Energy	   Efficiency	   Agency	   into	   the	   Agency	   for	   Sustainable	   Energy	   Development.	  
Although	   the	   rules	   of	   regulation	   for	   the	   agency	   were	   finally	   agreed	   upon	   by	   October	   2011,	   the	  
Agency	  only	  effectively	  began	  work	  in	  2012	  (Winkel	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
Additional	  policy	  changes	  affected	  the	  price	  determination	  of	  FITs	  for	  wind	  projects	  as	  well	  
as	  amendments	  to	  the	  Energy	  Act	  concerning	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  energy	  sector.	  However,	  tariffs	  
continued	  to	  be	  calculated	  and	  set	  for	  the	  whole	  period	  starting	  on	  the	  first	  of	  April	  each	  year	  to	  the	  
thirty-­‐first	  of	  March	  the	  next	  year	  in	  advance	  with	  little	  to	  no	  flexibility	  to	  respond	  to	  developments	  
on	   the	   energy	   market	   and	   falling	   technology	   costs
15
	   (Gramatikova,	   2012;	   Bulgaria	   State	   Gazette,	  
2013).	  As	  such,	  in	  2011	  FiT	  rates	  for	  solar	  PV	  projects	  were	  set	  just	  weeks	  before	  a	  significant	  drop	  in	  
technology	  costs,	  with	  no	  changes	  to	  the	  rates	  possible	  afterwards.
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  The	  consequent	  boom	  in	  solar	  
capacity	  development,	  and	  hence	  the	  reaching	  of	  its	  2020	  targets	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  resulted	  in	  a	  
moratorium	   on	   FiTs	   for	   new	   projects	   in	   2013.	   In	   February	   2015,	   the	   feed-­‐in	   tariff	   scheme	   was	  
officially	   ended	   for	   new	   renewable	   energy	   installations	   (EurObserv’Er,	   2015).	   Hence,	   renewable	  




Critically,	  the	  ‘success’	  of	  the	  renewable	  energy	  transition	  thus	  far	  had	  come	  at	  an	  immense	  
cost,	   considering	   electricity	   prices	   for	   lignite	   stood	   at	   about	   EUR13.5	   per	   MWh	   in	   2013,	   and	  
preferential	  prices	   for	   solar	  and	  wind	   stood	  at	  EUR	  118.3/MWh	  and	  EUR	  66.35/MWh	  respectively	  
(Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  2014,	  p.69).	  A	  threefold	  increase	  in	  CHP	  cogeneration	  electricity	  
at	  prices	  between	  EUR	  65/MWH	  and	  EUR	  70/MWh	  further	  led	  to	  rising	  costs	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  	  
(Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  2014).	  While	  Bulgaria	  has	  the	  lowest	  electricity	  and	  gas	  prices	  in	  






	  While	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  renewable	  capacity	  growth,	  including	  hydropower,	  stood	  at	  6.8%	  in	  2011	  and	  28%	  in	  




the	  EU,	  in	  terms	  of	  purchasing	  power	  standard	  Bulgaria’s	  prices	  are	  substantially	  higher	  than	  the	  EU	  
average	  (European	  Commission,	  2013).	  With	  energy	  poverty	  considered	  a	  major	  threat	  in	  Bulgaria’s	  
2011	  energy	  strategy	  (Government	  of	  Bulgaria,	  2011b),	  the	  government	  decided	  not	  to	  transfer	  the	  
entire	   cost	   of	   renewables	   onto	   end-­‐consumers.	   Nevertheless,	   rising	   electricity	   bills	   played	   a	  
triggering	  role	  in	  the	  protests	  emerging	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  2013	  that	  forced	  Prime	  Minister	  Borisov	  to	  
resign	   in	   February	   2013	   (Ivancheva,	   2013;	   Velinova	   et	   al.,	   2015;	   Smilov,	   2015).	   This	   development	  
ultimately	   plunged	   the	   country	   into	   political	   crisis	   as	   repeated	   protest	  waves	   led	   to	   three	   interim	  
governments	   and	   three	   elected	   governments	   between	   2012	   and	   2017	   with	   Borisov	   returning	   to	  
office	  in	  2014	  and	  again	  in	  2017	  (Deloy,	  2017,	  2014).	  
The	  economic	  crisis	  played	  a	  further	  negative	  role	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  financing	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  
energy	   system,	   as	   the	   country	   used	   to	   balance	   the	   low	   regulated	   electricity	   prices	   domestically	  
through	   the	   revenues	   generated	   through	   the	   export	   of	   electricity.	   However,	   with	   a	   weakened	  
demand	   from	   markets,	   such	   as	   Greece,	   Macedonia	   and	   Turkey	   during	   the	   crisis,	   and	   a	   strong	  
increase	   in	   renewables	   in	   neighbouring	   countries	   such	   as	   Romania,	   export	   revenues	   were	   falling	  
with	  the	  cost	  for	  energy	   increased	  (Hiteva	  and	  Maltby,	  2017).
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  Although	  the	  generous	  FiT	  scheme	  
and	   rising	   renewables	   shares	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   overall	   increased	   costs	   of	   Bulgaria’s	  
energy	  system,	  additional	   financial	  burdens	  stemmed	  from	   long-­‐term	  power	  purchase	  agreements	  
with	   coal	   and	  nuclear	   plant	   operators,	   and	   “black	   hole	   investment	   projects”,	   such	   as	   the	   recently	  
failed	   Belene	   nuclear	   power	   plant	   project	   (Center	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Democracy,	   2014,	   p.71).	   As	  
generation	   costs	   increased	   higher	   than	   utilities	   could	   lawfully	   charge	   their	   customers	   under	   the	  
regulated	  pricing	  regime,	  Bulgaria	  ran	  a	  severe	  deficit	  that	  resulted	   in	  a	  debt	  of	  BGN	  1.9	  billion,	  or	  
2%	  of	  GDP,	  in	  2015	  (World	  Bank,	  2016).	  To	  combat	  the	  significant	  tariff	  debt,	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2016)	  
urged	   Bulgaria	   to	   abandon	   its	   single-­‐buyer	   model	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   competitive	   power	   market	   that	  
would	  also	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  EU’s	   internal	  electricity	  market.	  The	  single-­‐buyer,	  the	  NEC,	   is	  
severely	  burdened	  by	  bearing	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  was	  at	  times	  unable	  to	  remunerate	  





energy	   generators	   due	   to	   cash	   flow	   problems.
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   However,	   following	   the	   recommendation	   to	  
continue	   the	   process	   of	   full	   market	   liberalisation	   and	   coupling	   with	   the	   EU	   electricity	   market	   is	  
feared	  to	  result	  in	  sharply	  rising	  electricity	  prices,	  as	  Bulgaria’s	  low	  consumer	  electricity	  prices	  align	  
with	  other	  European	  markets
20
	  (Eurostat,	  2017;	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  2014).	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  dire	  financial	  situation,	  government	  policies	  sought	  to	  decrease	  costs	  and	  
increase	   revenues	   from	   the	   energy	   system,	   for	   example	   through	   the	   2012	   grid	   access	   fees	   to	  
renewable	   energy	   generators,	  which	  was,	   however,	   later	   repealed	   by	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   on	  
discriminatory	   grounds	   (Grozdanov,	   2016).	   In	   December	   2013,	   an	   amendment	   to	   the	   ERSA	  
introduced	   a	   20%	   fee	   on	   solar	   and	  wind	  parks,	   adjusted	   FIT	   rates	   retroactively,	   and	   established	   a	  
threshold	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  electricity	  purchased	  at	  an	  FIT	  rate	  by	  the	  State	  Regulatory	  Energy	  and	  
Water	  Commission	  equivalent	  to	  about	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  generation	  capacity
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  (International	  Energy	  
Agency,	  2015b).	  This	  cap	  on	   renewables	  effectively	  excluded	  renewables	   from	  the	   free	  market	   for	  
the	  last	  two	  months	  in	  2015	  (Grozdanov,	  2016).	  The	  20%	  renewables	  fee	  was	  again	  repealed	  by	  the	  
constitutional	  court	  and	  since	  2015	  replaced	  by	  a	  5%	  production	  fee	  and	  balancing	  charges	  on	  the	  
revenues	  of	  all	  electricity	  generators	  (International	  Energy	  Agency,	  2015a).	  	  
	  
4. Bulgaria’s	  Renewable	  Energy	  Transition	  in	  Light	  of	  Energy	  Justice	  
In	   light	   of	   the	   outlined	   successes,	   challenges	   and	   implications	   of	   Bulgaria’s	   renewable	   energy	  
expansion,	   this	   section	   assesses	   the	   country’s	   renewable	   energy	   transition	   through	   the	   lens	   of	  
energy	  justice.	  This	  section	  analyses	  the	  eight	  aspects	  of	  energy	  justice	  in	  a	  grouped	  format.	  As	  the	  
expansion	  of	  renewables	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  energy	  justice,	  we	  seek	  
to	   determine	   the	   concrete	   effects	   of	   Bulgaria’s	   renewable	   energy	   transition	  on	   the	   justice,	   equity	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  In	  2014,	  the	  NEC	  owed	  some	  USD500	  million	  to	  generating	  companies	  (Ewing	  and	  Kantchev,	  2014)	  
20
	  As	  aforementioned,	  Bulgarian	  electricity	  prices	  are	  the	  lowest	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  therefore	  are	  expected	  to	  





and	  fairness	  of	  the	  country’s	  energy	  system.	  Other	   important	  factors	   include	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  regulatory	  framework,	  as	  well	  as	  oversight	  and	  participatory	  concerns.	  
	  
i. Due	  Process	  and	  Good	  Governance	  
Bulgaria’s	   renewable	   policy	   has	   been	   marred	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   a	   long-­‐term	   strategy,	   corruption	   and	  
administrative	   incompetence	   that	   resulted	   in	   frequent	   policy	   changes	   and	   therefore	   a	   significant	  
lack	  of	   regulatory	   stability	   (Hiteva	  and	  Maltby,	  2017).	   In	   this	   sub-­‐section	  we	  address	   (i)	   the	  public	  
availability	  of	  information	  on	  projects	  and	  government	  contracts,	  (ii)	  the	  inclusion	  of	  stakeholders	  in	  
the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   through	   effective	   consultations	   with	   the	   public,	   (iii)	   the	   provision	   of	  
environmental	   and	   social	   impact	   assessments,	   (iv)	   and	   the	   effectiveness,	   efficiency	   and	  
responsiveness	  of	  policies.	  
(i)	   Although	   Bulgaria	   has	   taken	   measures	   to	   combat	   corruption,	   reports	   on	   the	  
implementation	  of	  Decree	  114	  on	  the	  monitoring	  and	  control	  over	  the	  financial	  conditions	  of	  state-­‐
owned	  enterprises	  showed	  significant	  deficiencies	  for	  example	   in	  providing	  the	  required	  additional	  
performance	   analysis,	   lacking	   consistency	   in	   their	   reports,	   showing	   discrepancies	   between	   annual	  
reports	  of	   the	  government	  and	  companies,	  and	   including	  factual	  mistakes	  (Center	   for	   the	  Study	  of	  
Democracy,	  2014).	  Under	   its	   legal	  requirements	  driven	  by	  EU	  regulation,	  the	  government	  provides	  
several	   platforms	   of	   information	   for	   public	   access.	   The	   Sustainable	   Energy	   Development	   Agency	  
maintains	  a	  database	  of	  renewable	  and	  heating	  projects.
22
	  The	  Agency	  also	  provides	  a	  contact	  point	  
to	  report	  corruption.	  Furthermore,	  Bulgaria’s	  Electric	  System	  Operator	  provides	  hourly	  data	  on	  the	  
generation	   of	   electricity	   based	   on	   source,	   including	   data	   on	   electricity	   imported	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
liberalisation	  process	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  Electricity	  Market.
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Crucially,	  through	  the	  financial	  support	  of	  the	  EU’s	  PHARE	  Programme	  and	  the	  Operational	  
Programme	  Administrative	  Capacity	  that	  is	  co-­‐funded	  through	  the	  European	  Social	  Fund,	  Bulgaria’s	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  Accessible	  only	  in	  Bulgarian	  at:	  http://www.seea.government.bg/bg/	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  Available	  at:	  http://www.eso.bg/?did=124#Начална	  страница	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Public	  Procurement	  Agency	  (PPA)	  –	  itself	  established	  as	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  accession	  process	  in	  2004
24
	  –	  
created	  a	  registry	  of	  public	  procurement	  contracts	  on	  its	  online	  portal	  in	  2009.
25
	  Energy	  enterprises	  
took	  up	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  government	  contracts	   in	  2010-­‐2012	  public	  procurement	  processes	  of	  
about	   20%	   (Center	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Democracy,	   2014).	   While	   information	   on	   general	   renewable	  
support	   is	   transparent	  due	  to	  EU	  reporting	  requirements	  and	  publicly	  regulated	  FiT	   levels,	  data	  on	  
government	  contracts	  with	  conventional	  power	  generators	  remain	  difficult	  to	  access.	  The	  registry	  of	  
the	  PPA	  is	  counterintuitive	  to	  operate,	  registration	  necessary	  to	  access	  the	  advanced	  search	  engine,	  
and	  pieces	  of	  information	  spread	  out	  across	  different	  access	  points.	  As	  such,	  there	  remains	  no	  easy	  
access	  to	  details,	  and	  “the	  current	  opaque	  system	  of	  governance	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  is	  prone	  
to	  abuses	  of	  public	   funds	  and	  serious	  neglect	  of	   the	  companies’	   interest”	   (Center	   for	   the	  Study	  of	  
Democracy,	  2014,	  p.94).	  	  
(ii)	   Based	   on	   the	   opaque	   information	   system,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   lack	   of	   data	   on	   government	  
consultations	  with	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  public.	  According	  to	  the	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy	  
(2010,	  2017,	  2014),	  the	  government	  does	  not	  provide	  meaningful	  consultations	  on	  energy	  projects,	  
despite	   the	   importance	   of	   an	   inclusive	   approach	   to	   ensure	   “that	   social	   needs	   are	   also	   taken	   into	  
consideration	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process”	   (Center	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Democracy,	   2014,	   p.76).	  
Based	  on	  our	   interviews
26
,	  government	  miscommunication	  was	  indeed	  a	  crucial	   issue	  in	  the	  winter	  
2013	  protest	  that	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Borisov	  government	  following	  an	  increase	  in	  
regulated	  electricity	  prices	  to	  cover	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  rising	  renewable	  generation	  levels	  
(Velinova	   et	   al.,	   2015).	   As	   the	   former	  minister	   of	   energy	   in	   the	   2013	   interim	   government,	   Julian	  
Popov,	  told	  us:	  
“People	  were	  very	  surprised	  by	  the	  electricity	  prices	  because	  they	  received	  bills	  for	  forty-­‐five	  
days	  rather	  than	  thirty	  days,	  which	  coincided	  with	  the	  increase	  of	  electricity	  prices	  by	  13%,	  
which	   was	   not	   a	   lot,	   considering	   in	   the	   period	   of	   two	   or	   three	   years,	   prices	   were	   not	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  The	  Public	  Procurement	  Agency	  is	  governed	  by	  Decree	  No	  56	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  (prom.	  SG	  No	  
24/23.03.2004).	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  Available	  at:	  http://rop3-­‐app1.aop.bg:7778/portal/page?_pageid=173,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL	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increased	   at	   all.	   So	   the	   increase	   was	   modest	   but	   very	   badly	   communicated	   because	  




The	  lack	  of	  effective	  communication	  between	  government	  and	  stakeholders	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  
early-­‐2012	  protests	  against	  Chevron’s	  plan	  to	  begin	  shale-­‐gas	  exploration	  in	  Bulgaria	  that	  highlighted	  
“that	   corporations	   and	   government	   did	   not	   consult	   the	   people	   and	   did	   not	   make	   the	   slightest	  
attempt	   to	   create	   shared	   value”(Popov,	   2013).	   The	   subsequent	   ban	   of	   fracking	   “was	   […]	   a	  
punishment	  for	  inappropriate	  public	  behaviour	  by	  the	  people	  in	  power.	  And	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  the	  
political	  parties	  and	  powerful	  corporations	  failed	  to	  see”	  (Popov,	  2013).	  	  
(iii)	   The	   government	   is	   obligated	   under	   EU	   Directives	   2003/35/EC	   (European	   Commission,	  
2003)	   and	   2009/31/EC	   (European	   Commission,	   2009),	   as	   well	   as	   by	   Bulgaria’s	   Environmental	  
Protection	   Act	   to	   provide	   environmental	   impact	   assessments	   (EIAs)	   on	   defined	   projects	   and	  
developments,	  as	  seen	  for	  example	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  South	  Stream	  Gas	  pipeline	  (Institute	  of	  Energy	  
for	  South-­‐East	  Europe,	  2014).	  Based	  on	  Annex	  1	  of	  the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Act	  (Government	  
of	  Bulgaria,	  2014)	  that	  outlines	  projects	  in	  need	  of	  EIAs,	  renewable	  projects,	  such	  as	  large-­‐scale	  wind	  
farms	  or	  hydropower	  plants	  are	  not	  mentioned,	  while	  crude	  oil	  refineries,	  thermal	  power	  stations,	  
and	   nuclear	   power	   stations	   are.	   However,	   for	   example,	   large-­‐scale	   wind	   installations	   can	   have	  
significant	   adverse	   environmental	   effects	   (Powlesland,	   2009;	   Zimmerling	  et	   al.,	   2013).	   Indeed,	   the	  
Court	   of	   Justice	  of	   the	   European	  Union,	   ruled	   in	   2016	   that	   the	  Republic	   of	   Bulgaria	   failed	   to	   fulfil	  
inter	   alia	   its	   obligations	   under	   Article	   4(4)	   of	   the	   Birds	   Directive	   allowing	   the	   implementation	   of	  
several	  wind	  farm	  projects	  in	  the	  Kaliakra	  region	  despite	  its	  importance	  for	  migratory	  species	  (Court	  
of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  2016).	  	  
(iv)	   Although	   the	   initial	   design	   of	   the	   country’s	   support	   scheme	  was	   generally	   effective	   in	  
generating	  a	  fast	  expansion	  of	  renewables	  capacity,	  due	  to	  its	  extremely	  generous	  tariff	  scheme	  far	  
above	   market	   prices
28
	   the	   system	   was	   neither	   efficient	   nor	   responsive	   as	   it	   “did	   not	   provide	  
adequate	   FIT	   buffers	   and	   did	   not	   account	   for	  market,	   social	   and	   economic	   risks”	   (Center	   for	   the	  







Study	   of	   Democracy,	   2014,	   p.71).	   Crucially,	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   clear	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   provides	  
opportunities	   for	   interest	   groups	   to	   lobby	   decision-­‐makers	   and	   exert	   corruptive	   pressure	  
(Mantcheva	  et	  al.,	  2012,	  p.7).	  In	  fact,	  the	  2020	  targets	  were	  set	  to	  be	  achieved	  steadily	  over	  a	  period	  
of	  time	  to	  incentivise	  technological	  and	  therefore	  cost	  advancements	  in	  renewable	  energy	  sources.	  
A	  more	  gradual	  growth	  trajectory	  of	  renewables	  would	  have	  allowed	  for	  costs	  to	  be	  distributed	  over	  
a	  longer	  time,	  including	  grid	  expansion	  costs.	  Instead,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  the	  costs	  were	  carried	  
by	  the	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  now	  will	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  taxpayers	  to	  pay	  
the	   companies’	   debt.
29
	   As	   such,	   due	   to	   the	   corrupted	   and	   mismanaged	   policy	   framework	   for	  
renewables,	  households	  currently	  pay	  a	  significantly	  higher	  than	  necessary	  share	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  
renewables	  transition.	  These	  additional	  costs	  burden	  economically	  weaker	  households	  significantly	  
more	  as	  energy	  poverty	  is	  already	  a	  major	  issue	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  system	  regulating	  the	  preferential	  prices	  repeatedly	  proved	  inadequate	  to	  
foresee	   and	   respond	   to	   market	   dynamics.	   The	   problematic	   regulatory	   framework	   was	  
complemented	  with	  a	  general	   incapacity	  and	   incompetence	  of	  administrative	  bodies.	  For	  example,	  
the	  2011	  ERSA	  delegated	  the	  development	  of	  procedures	  to	  implement	  renewables	  projects	  to	  local	  
governments,	  rather	  than	  providing	  a	  national	  framework	  to	  simplify	  processes	  (Winkel	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
Municipal	   administrations,	   however,	   lacked	   the	   expertise	   and	   staff	   to	   address	   these	   tasks	  
adequately	   (Mantcheva	  et	  al.,	   2012).	  As	  a	   result,	   the	  application	  of	  a	  private	  person	   for	  a	   rooftop	  
solar	   installation	   requires	   a	   very	   similar	   amount	  of	   paperwork	   as	   for	   a	   developer	   to	   apply	   for	   the	  




ii. Availability,	  Sustainability	  and	  Affordability	  
Bulgaria’s	   renewable	  energy	   transition	  provides	   a	  mixed	  picture	   in	   terms	  of	  distributive	   justice.	   In	  
this	  sub-­‐section,	  we	  determine	  the	  energy	  justice	  principles	  in	  light	  of	  (i)	  overall	  energy	  dependence	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levels,	   (ii)	   stability	  of	   electricity	   supply,	   (iii)	   sustainability	   improvements	   in	   terms	  of	   emissions	   and	  
energy	  intensity,	  and	  (iv)	  actual	  electricity	  costs	  and	  price	  stability.	  	  
(i)	   Through	   the	   expansion	   of	   renewable	   energy	   capacities,	   Bulgaria’s	   energy	   market	  
benefitted	   from	   an	   increasing	   diversification	   of	   its	   electricity	   mix.	   While	   the	   country’s	   largest	  
renewable	  energy	  source,	  hydropower,	  increased	  marginally	  from	  a	  capacity	  of	  over	  2.8GW	  in	  2006	  
to	   3.2GW	   in	   2014,	   solar,	   wind	   and	   to	   a	   minor	   degree	   biomass	   capacity	   grew	   significantly.	   Wind	  
power	  capacity	  rose	  from	  27MW	  in	  2006	  to	  690MW	  in	  2014,	  while	  solar	  photovoltaics	  power	  only	  
emerged	   in	   2009	   with	   a	   mere	   2MW	   installed	   capacity,	   yet	   increased	   to	   over	   1.03GW	   by	   2014	  
(D’Ortigue	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  Biomass	  plays	  only	  a	  minor	  role	  in	  the	  overall	  mix,	  increasing	  from	  6MW	  in	  
2006	   to	   52MW	   in	   2014	   (D’Ortigue	   et	   al.,	   2015).	   As	   such,	  wind	   and	   solar	   power	   have	   pushed	   the	  
overall	  renewables	  share	  in	  total	  electricity	  generation	  from	  	  9.37%	  of	  in	  2006	  to	  over	  19.1%	  in	  2015	  
(Eurostat,	  2017).	  
	   Since	   renewables	  are	  a	  domestic	   source	  of	  energy,	   their	  expansion	  has	  positive	  effects	  on	  
Bulgaria’s	  import	  dependence.	  While	  in	  2008,	  about	  52%	  of	  energy	  was	  imported,	  this	  rate	  dropped	  
to	  just	  above	  35%	  in	  2015,	  the	  fifth	  lowest	  score	  across	  the	  EU-­‐28	  (Eurostat,	  2017).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	   that	   the	   EU’s	   energy	   dependence	   level	   considers	   nuclear	   energy	   production	   as	   indigenous,	  
ignoring	  the	   import	  of	  nuclear	   fuels	   (Government	  of	  Bulgaria,	  2008).	  As	  the	   import	  dependence	  of	  
feedstock	  for	  nuclear	  power	  generation	  –	  the	  second	  largest	  source	  for	  total	  electricity	  generation	  –	  
is	   100%,	   in	   the	   past	   the	  Government	   of	   Bulgaria	   considered	   the	   actual	   import	   dependence	   about	  
25%	  higher	  than	  the	  rate	  provided	  by	  Eurostat	  (Government	  of	  Bulgaria,	  2011b).	  As	  all	  nuclear	  (and	  
natural	   gas)	   imports	   originate	   from	   Russia,	   the	   EU	   Commission	   stressed	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   more	  
diversified	  import	  sources	  remain	  a	  concern	  (European	  Commission,	  2013).	  
Furthermore,	   Bulgaria	   has	   so	   far	  missed	   the	   opportunity	   to	   address	   issues	   related	   to	   the	  
large	   portion	   of	   particularly	   rural	   households	   that	   continue	   to	   heat	   with	   wood	   and	   uses	   oil	  
generators	  as	  backup	  electricity	  sources	  (Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  2014).	  Although	  solar	  
PV	   installations	   could	   help	   overcome	  associated	  price	   and	  pollution	   (and	   therefore	   health)	   issues,	  
19	  
	  
growth	   in	   residential	   installations	   is	   sluggish	   –	   despite	   continuing	   government	   programmes	   –	  
primarily	  due	  to	  the	  bureaucratic	  procedures	  necessary	  to	  develop	  solar	  PV	  installations.	  An	  analyst	  
from	  the	  Bulgarian	  Center	   for	   the	  Study	  of	  Democracy	  also	  noted	   that	  a	  general	   scepticism	   in	   the	  
population	   towards	   government	   programmes	   in	   light	   of	   the	   sense	   of	   corruption	   is	   preventing	   a	  
greater	  interest	  in	  residential	  solar.
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(ii)	  Bulgaria’s	  renewable	  energy	  transition	  further	  provided	  upgrades	  to	  the	  electricity	  grid	  as	  
important	  expansions	  to	  the	  transmission	  network	  and	  additional	  substations	  were	  realised	  in	  2012	  
(Jirous	  et	  al.,	  2011).The	  split	  of	  the	  public	  electricity	  provider,	  the	  National	  Electric	  Company	  (NEC),	  
from	   the	   system	   operator	   as	   part	   of	   the	   unbundling	   process	   was	   also	   completed	   in	   early	   2014	  
(Energy	   and	   Water	   Regulatory	   Commission	   Bulgaria,	   2015).	   Overall,	   owed	   to	   the	   EU’s	   financial	  
support	   through	   the	   European	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development	   in	   developing	   the	  
country’s	  infrastructure,	  power	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  losses	  in	  percent	  of	  output	  have	  been	  
falling	   steadily	   since	   2002	   from	   almost	   15%	   to	   about	   8.5%	   in	   2014	   (World	   Bank,	   2017a).	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   average	   distribution	   loss	   of	   almost	   400	   tonnes	   of	   oil	   equivalent,	   represents	   the	  
second	   highest	   in	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   Countries	   (Center	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Democracy,	  
2014).	  
(iii)	  The	  growth	  in	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  has	  lowered	  the	  environmental	  footprint	  
of	   the	   country’s	   energy	   system	   in	   terms	   of	   emissions.	   CO2	   emissions	   in	   kilo	   tonnes	   (kt)	   have	  
decreased	   from	   52.3	   thousand	   kt	   in	   2007	   to	   just	   above	   39.5	   thousand	   kt	   in	   2013.	   While	   CO2	  
emissions	   from	   solid	   fuels,	   ie.	   coal,	   as	   a	   share	   of	   total	   emissions	   have	   effectively	   remained	  
unchanged	  at	  58%,	  actual	  emissions	  from	  solid	  fuels	  in	  kt	  fell	  from	  30.4	  thousand	  kt	  in	  2007	  to	  23.2	  
in	  2013	  (World	  Bank,	  2017b).	  As	  a	  result,	  total	  greenhouse	  gas	  (GHG)	  emissions	  decreased	  by	  over	  
37%	  in	  2012	  from	  1990	  levels	  (World	  Bank,	  2017b).	  These	  developments	  are	  reflected	  in	  Bulgaria’s	  
environmental	  sustainability	  score	  of	  the	  World	  Energy	  Council	  that	  increased	  steadily	  over	  the	  past	  
years	   (World	   Energy	   Council,	   2015).	   Although	   energy	   intensity	   levels	   decreased	   by	   39%	   between	  





2006	   and	   2010	   (European	   Commission,	   2013),	   Bulgaria	   continues	   to	   have	   one	   of	   the	  worst	   index	  
scores	  across	   the	  EU	   (Center	   for	   the	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  2014).	  Energy	  expenditure	  volatility	  and	  
intensity	   stand	   at	   3180%	  and	  855%	  above	   average	  OECD	   risk	   levels,	   and	  CO2	  per	  GDP	  and	  energy	  
intensity	   370%	   and	   289%	   above	   average	   OECD	   risk	   levels	   respectively	   (Center	   for	   the	   Study	   of	  
Democracy,	  2014).	  
(iv)	  Although	  yearly	  household	  incomes	  have	  increased	  steadily	  since	  Bulgaria’s	  accession	  to	  
the	  EU	  in	  2007,	  parallel	  rising	  electricity	  prices	  resulted	  in	  an	  increase	  of	  household	  expenditure	  on	  
housing,	  energy,	  water,	  and	  other	  fuels	  from	  11.5%	  of	  total	  income	  in	  2007	  to	  14.4%	  in	  2012	  (Center	  
for	  the	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  2014),	  and	  14.3%	  in	  2016	  (National	  Statistical	  Institute,	  2017).
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  Official	  
data	  estimates	  that	  only	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  Bulgarian	  population	  is	  able	  to	  afford	  adequate	  heating	  in	  
their	   homes.	   Since	   electricity	   prices	   remain	   state-­‐regulated,	   there	   is	   little	   volatility	   in	   the	   price	  
developments.	  However,	   although	   in	   principle	   all	   consumers	   are	   free	   to	   choose	   their	   supplier,	   no	  
actual	  switching	  is	  observed,	  as	  through	  the	  regulated	  prices	  for	  household	  consumers,	  there	  is	  no	  
benefit	   in	  switching	  and	  the	  retail	  electricity	  market	  remains	  highly	  concentrated	  with	  eight	  out	  of	  
total	  24	  power	  retailers	  taking	  92%	  of	  the	  market	  in	  2012	  (European	  Commission,	  2014b).	  
	  
iii. Intra-­‐	  and	  Intergenerational	  Justice	  and	  Responsibility	  
As	   outlined	   in	   the	   section	   on	   availability,	   the	   expansion	   of	   renewables	   is	   associated	   with	   an	  
improved	   grid	   infrastructure,	   as	  well	   as	   an	   the	   improved	   access	   to	   a	   decentralised	   energy	   source	  
(solar).	   In	   terms	   of	   intragenerational	   equity,	   these	   effects	   enhanced	   the	   access	   of	   Bulgaria’s	  
population	  to	  “minimal	  energy	  services	  which	  enable	  them	  to	  enjoy	  a	  basic	  minimum	  of	  wellbeing”	  
(Sovacool	   and	   Dworkin,	   2015,	   p.440).	   However,	   the	   increased	   costs	   of	   electricity	   affect	   poorer	  
consumers	  disproportionately	  more,	  and	  the	  government	  failed	  to	  adequately	  drive	  the	  installation	  
of	   small-­‐scale	   renewable	   installations	   to	   replace	   polluting	   wood	   and	   oil	   generators.	   	   Crucially,	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32
	  Bulgaria	  has	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  rate	  of	  home-­‐owners	  in	  the	  EU	  with	  few	  outstanding	  mortgages,	  meaning	  for	  
the	  majority	  of	  Bulgarians	  (over	  80%),	  housing	  costs	  are	  zero,	  while	  another	  15%	  of	  the	  population	  lives	  in	  
reduced	  fee	  tenancy	  agreements	  (European	  Commission,	  2018).	  The	  over	  14%	  expenditure	  share	  for	  housing,	  
water	  and	  energy	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  this	  light.	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thereby	  failed	  to	  improve	  the	  equity	  of	  the	  current	  energy	  system	  as	  grey	  markets	  for	  poor-­‐quality	  
wood	   used	   in	   heating	   continue	   to	   drive	   prices	   down,	   and	   undermine	   regulations	   to	   preserve	  
Bulgaria’s	  forest	  stock	  and	  increase	  the	  country’s	  environmental	  footprint	  (Mantcheva	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
	  Most	   importantly,	  the	  failure	  to	  meet	  fundamental	  energy	  justice	  principles	   in	  due	  process	  
and	  good	  governance	  directly	  led	  to	  the	  dismantling	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  renewable	  energy	  transition.	  While	  
the	  absence	  of	  a	  supportive	   regulatory	   framework	   for	   renewables,	   such	  as	   the	   lack	  of	  preferential	  
prices,	   is	  not	  an	   insurmountable	  obstacle,	   the	  associated	   financial	  burden	  and	  sense	  of	  corruption	  
has	   undermined	   public	   support.	   Although	   important	   progress	   in	   terms	   of	   environmental	  
sustainability	   was	   made	   through	   the	   advance	   of	   renewables	   between	   2007	   and	   2013,	   financial	  
pressures,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  backing	  and	  external	   incentives	  –	  since	  the	  renewable	  targets	  are	  
already	   met	   –	   undermine	   the	   further	   advance	   of	   sustainability	   improvements	   and	   thereby	  
intergenerational	  equity.	  As	  such,	   the	  government	   is	   failing	  to	  adequately	   fulfil	   its	   responsibility	   to	  
protect	   the	   environment,	   mitigate	   climate	   change	   and	   safeguard	   the	   rights	   of	   access	   to	  
environmental	   and	   energy	   services.	   As	   the	   government	   failed	   to	   provide	   a	   stable	   investment	  
environment	   that	   acknowledged	   environmental,	   financial	   and	   social	   factors	   of	   the	   promotion	   of	  
renewables,	  hopes	  rest	  with	  the	  growing	  competitiveness	  of	  renewable	  technologies.	  As	  the	  former	  
minister	  of	  energy	  in	  the	  2013	  interim	  government,	  Julian	  Popov,	  said:	  “From	  now	  on,	  the	  only	  thing	  





5. Discussion	  and	  Conclusions	  
Through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  energy	  justice	  framework,	  we	  were	  able	  to	  determine	  how	  Bulgaria’s	  
expansion	  of	  renewables	  in	  light	  of	  its	  2020	  targets	  led	  to	  an	  improved	  energy	  dependence	  and	  grid	  
infrastructure	   that	   ensured	   a	   more	   stable,	   safe	   and	   clean	   distribution	   of	   electricity.	   At	   the	   same	  
time,	   the	  analysis	  highlighted	   the	   fundamental	   shortcomings	   in	  due	  process	  and	  good	  governance	  





that	   enabled	   a	   corrupted	   and	   mismanaged	   regulatory	   framework.	   These	   issues	   resulted	   in	   a	  
disproportionate	   burdening	   of	   current	   consumers	   and	   undermined	   the	   sustainability	   of	   Bulgaria’s	  
renewable	   energy	   transition,	   and	   thereby	   intergenerational	   equity.	   Indeed,	   the	   findings	   of	   the	  	  
intragenerational	   justice	  aspects	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  renewable	  energy	  transition	  beg	  for	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  
assessment	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   further	   vulnerable	   social	   groups	   as	   identified	   by	   Bouzarovski	   et.	   al.	  	  
(2017).	  
Beyond	  the	  adverse	  political	  and	  regulatory	  context	  visible	  in	  the	  Bulgarian	  case,	  renewable	  
energy	  transitions	  are	  seen	  to	  serve	  as	  important	  facilitators	  of	  improving	  energy	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  
availability	   and	   sustainability	   of	   energy	   systems.	   They	   represent	   a	   central	   tool	   for	   governments	  
seeking	   to	   address	   contemporary	   environmental	   and	   climate	   issues,	   and	   provide	   greater	  
intergenerational	   equity.	   However,	   while	   renewable	   energy	   transitions	   can	   generally	   improve	  
distributive	   justice	   in	  terms	  of	  pollution	  and	  access	  to	  clean	  energy,	  they	  can	  potentially	  aggravate	  
the	  financial	  burden	  of	  energy	  to	  consumers.	  For	  renewable	  energy	  transitions	  to	  therefore	  advance	  
energy	   justice	  as	  a	  whole	   requires	  a	   long-­‐term	  government	   strategy	   to	  enable	  a	   responsive	  policy	  
framework	   that	  effectively	  and	  efficiently	  drives	   the	  expansion	  of	   renewable	  capacity	  and	   thereby	  
protects	  society	  from	  both	  environmental	  and	  financial	  burdens.	  
As	   such,	   by	   omission	   Bulgaria’s	   renewable	   energy	   transition	   affirmed	   the	   general	  
assumptions	   of	   influential	   factors	   shaping	   renewable	   energy	   transitions.	   The	   case	   of	   Bulgaria’s	  
renewables	  expansion	  showed	  how	  the	   lack	  of	  an	  effective	  and	  dynamic	  policy	  design	  undermines	  
the	  sustainability	  of	  renewable	  energy	  transitions.	  This	  has	  been	  particularly	  expressed	  in	  Bulgaria’s	  
weak	   macroeconomic	   context,	   in	   which	   large	   portions	   of	   the	   population	   struggle	   with	   energy	  
poverty,	   and	   in	   times	   of	   economic	   crisis	   and	   austerity	   experience	   a	   falling	   purchasing	   power.	   The	  
absence	  of	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  commitment	   to	   sustainability	   transitions	  by	   the	  government	   resulted	   in	  a	  
regulatory	  environment	  driven	  by	  external	   targets	  without	  a	   long-­‐term	  strategy,	  and	  was	  prone	  to	  
abuse.	  Bulgaria’s	  mismanaged	  policy	  design	  had	  significant	  financial	  implications	  for	  companies	  and	  
consumers	   that	   further	   undermined	   public	   support	   in	   a	   growing	   perception	   of	   government	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corruption.	   The	   opacity	   in	   energy	   contracts	   with	   conventional	   power	   plants	   eased	   the	   political	  
decision	   to	   focus	   the	   blame	   for	   rising	   electricity	   prices	   almost	   exclusively	   on	   renewables	   that	  
followed	  an	  EU-­‐induced	  greater	  public	  transparency.
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As	   the	   result	   of	   an	   abused	   top-­‐down	   policy	   approach,	   officially	   achieving	   the	   2020	  
renewable	  targets	  in	  2013	  resulted	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  political	  incentive	  to	  expand	  renewables	  further	  
and	   led	   to	  a	   cessation	  of	   support	   for	   commercial	   renewable	  projects.	  The	   subsequent	  ending	  of	  a	  
supportive	   renewables	   policy	   after	   the	   reaching	   of	   the	   2020	   targets	   has	   halted	   the	   process	   of	  
improving	  the	  sustainability	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  energy	  system	  and	  led	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  “so-­‐called	  
energy	   transition	   in	   Bulgaria	   never	   happened”.
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   In	   effect,	   due	   to	   the	   regulatory	   overshoot,	   the	  
“renewable	  energy	  market	  over-­‐burnt	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  its	  development	  […,	  and]	  the	  greediness	  





In	   conclusion,	   Bulgaria’s	   renewable	   energy	   transition	   followed	   a	   boom	   and	   bust	   cycle	   that	   was	  
marked	   by	   a	   rapid	   expansion	   of	   renewable	   energy	   capacity	   until	   2012,	   and	   subsequent	   policy	  
adjustments	  that	  halted	  the	  development	  of	  new	  projects.	  Driven	  by	  a	  generous	  preferential	  pricing	  
scheme	  that	  served	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  some,	  the	  fast	  uptake	  of	  renewable	  capacity	  was	  aided	  
by	   general	   government	   incompetence	   in	   the	   design	   of	   the	   regulatory	   framework.	   The	   rapidly	  
accumulating	  cost	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  renewable	  electricity	  and	  associated	  grid	  updates	  added	  to	  a	  
growing	  financial	  burden	  in	  light	  of	  falling	  energy	  export	  levels	  during	  the	  economic	  crisis.	  	  Lacking	  a	  
domestic	   commitment	   for	   sustainability	   transitions,	   the	   expansion	   of	   renewables	   ended	   as	   the	  
external	  incentive	  in	  form	  of	  the	  2020	  targets	  was	  reached,	  and	  financial	  pressures	  mounted.	  	  
	   Conceptually,	   we	   expanded	   the	   energy	   justice	   framework	   to	   a	   case	   of	   a	   less-­‐wealthy	  
European	  state,	  and	  showcased	  how	  it	  can	  benefit	  analyses	  of	  similar	  contexts.	  While	  its	  application	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was	  in	  part	  aggravated	  by	  the	  opacity	  of	  information,	  the	  analytical	  experience	  thereby	  mirrored	  the	  
challenges	   of	   Bulgaria’s	   renewable	   energy	   transition.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   energy	   justice	  
framework	  also	  depicted	  the	  potentials	  in	  terms	  of	  reframing	  the	  current	  policy	  approach.	  As	  seen	  in	  
this	   article,	   energy	   justice	   has	   the	   ability	   to	   highlight	   societal	   and	   economic	   injustices,	   as	   well	   as	  
identify	   their	   origin	   or	   potential	   causes	   in	   existing	   regulatory	   frameworks	   and	   policy-­‐making	  
processes.	  We	   therefore	   exemplified	   the	   distinct	   value	   of	   energy	   justice	   as	   an	   analytical	   tool	   and	  
stress	   its	   value	   in	   informing	   also	   future	   policy	   decisions,	   both	   at	   a	   national	   and	   EU	   level.	   In	   fact,	  
future	  target	  frameworks	  that	  include	  energy	  justice	  can	  potentially	  prevent	  similar	  adverse	  societal	  
and	  economic	  impacts	  of	  climate	  action,	  as	  seen	  in	  Bulgaria,	  providing	  a	  more	  sustainable,	  long-­‐term	  
policy	  pathway.	  
Although	  the	  analysis	  was	  solely	  focused	  on	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  valuable	  lessons	  for	  similar	  
political,	   economic	   and	   societal	   contexts	   can	   be	   drawn.	   Through	   the	   analysis,	   we	   identified	   the	  
general	   potential	   of	   renewables	   to	   improve	   distributive	   justice	   in	   light	   of	   the	   justice	   principles	   of	  
availability	  and	  sustainability.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  analysis	  highlighted	  the	  fundamental	  need	  for	  
good	  governance	  and	  due	  process	  to	  provide	  an	  effective,	  efficient	  and	  responsive	  policy	  framework	  
that	  serves	  the	  interest	  of	  society.	  	  Otherwise,	  a	  mismanaged	  renewable	  energy	  transition	  can	  lead	  
to	  a	  worsening	  of	   the	  affordability	  principle	  by	  overburdening	  consumers	  and	  resulting	   in	  growing	  
energy	  poverty.	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  analysis,	  such	  financial	  pressures	  undermine	  the	  overall	  sustainability	  
of	  the	  transition	  and	  thereby	  endanger	  intergenerational	  equity.	  
Our	   analysis	   affirmed	   the	   general	   assumptions	  on	   influential	   factors	   for	   renewable	  energy	  
transitions.	   It	   depicted	   the	   societal,	   economic	   and	   political	   implications	   of	   a	   renewable	   energy	  
transition	  that	  lacked	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  and	  support,	  and	  an	  effective	  and	  dynamic	  policy	  design	  
in	  a	  macro-­‐economic	  context	  of	  rising	  energy	  poverty	  and	  decreasing	  purchasing	  power	  during	  the	  
economic	   crisis	   and	   austerity.	   Rather	   than	   create	   a	   system	   of	   good	   governance	   and	   due	   process,	  
Bulgaria’s	   pre-­‐existing	   dynamics	   of	   state	   capture	   drove	   the	   country’s	   rapid	   renewable	   energy	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